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Abbreviations and Acronyms
beps Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
ebitda Earnings Before Interest Income 
and Expense, Depreciation And 
Amortisation
epzs Export Processing Zones   
fhtp Forum on Harmful Tax Practices
gdp Gross Domestic Product 
ip Intellectual Property
ita Income Tax Act 
knbs Kenya National Bureau of Statis-
tics    
mnes Multinational Enterprises  
nri Natural Resource Income
oecd Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
pepa Petroleum (Exploration and Pro-
duction) Act
psc Production Sharing Contract
sezs Special Economic Zones   
vat Value Added Tax   
wdi World Development Indicators
Abstract
Many countries, especially the develop-
ing countries, offer various tax incentives 
to attract foreign investment for sectoral 
growth and development. This phenomenon 
presents even more in the extractive industry 
because the sector is not only highly spe-
cialized but is also capital and technology 
intensive. There is currently a major concern 
of illicit financial flow from Africa and the 
threat it posess on domestic resource mobi-
lization. The Mbeki report (2015) highlights 
tax incentives, abuse of tax treaties, transfer 
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pricing, weak tax administrations, poorly 
designed tax regimes and poorly negotiated 
extractive contracts as some of the main 
causes of illicit financial flows. It follows 
that granting tax incentives, especially if not 
properly designed, to the extractive industry 
can exacerbate the problem.
Eastern Africa has in recent years become 
an area of interest for many international oil 
and gas companies. Oil was discovered in 
Uganda and Kenya in 2006 and 2012, re-
spectively, while Tanzania and Mozambique 
have vast gas reserves (Augé, 2015). This 
presents an opportunity for the region to pre-
pare the ground by putting in place the right 
legislative framework to benefit fully from 
the extractive activities. The paper examines 
the policy and practical challenges of the oil 
and gas tax regime from an international tax 
perspective. The paper analyzes tax incen-
tives available in the oil and gas sector and 
whether they are harmful or not within the 
scope oecd beps Action 5, international tax 
risk areas, available interventions in the cur-
rent law, and makes policy recommendation. 
The tax regime has addressed most of 
the international tax risk areas. The ita re-
quires arm’s length pricing of transactions. 
Tax incentives should target specific indus-
tries, apply for a limited time period, leave 
little room for personal discretion, and be 
reviewed to ensure their efficiency and ef-
fectiveness. The ita has Transfer Pricing 
Rules, Ring-fencing rules, thin capitalization 
rules and provides for taxation of net gain on 
indirect transfers However, there are chal-
lenges such as inadequate capacity to audit 
costs, lack of quality comparables data, ex-
ploitation of the debt to equity ratio interest 
restriction through increasing capital, and 
dispute resolution. The paper recommends 
building more capacity, enhancement of 
legislation and cooperation between govern-
ment agencies to keep up with the growing 
needs of the industry.
Keywords: Tax Incentives, Extractive 
Industry, Oil & Gas. 
Resumen
Muchos países, especialmente los países 
en desarrollo, ofrecen diversos incentivos 
fiscales para atraer inversiones extranjeras 
para el crecimiento y el desarrollo sectorial. 
Este fenómeno se presenta aún más en la 
industria extractiva porque el sector no solo 
es altamente especializado, sino que tam-
bién es intensivo en capital y tecnología. 
Actualmente existe una gran preocupación 
por el flujo financiero ilícito de África y la 
amenaza que representa para la movilización 
de recursos nacionales. El informe Mbeki 
(2015) destaca los incentivos fiscales, el 
abuso de los tratados tributarios, los precios 
de transferencia, las administraciones tribu-
tarias débiles, los regímenes tributarios mal 
diseñados y los contratos extractivos mal 
negociados como algunas de las principales 
causas de los flujos financieros ilícitos. De 
ello se deduce que otorgar incentivos fiscales 
a la industria extractiva, especialmente si no 
están diseñados adecuadamente, puede exa-
cerbar el problema.
África oriental se ha convertido en los últi-
mos años en un área de interés para muchas 
compañías internacionales de petróleo y gas. 
El petróleo se descubrió en Uganda y Kenia 
en 2006 y 2012, respectivamente, mientras 
que Tanzania y Mozambique tienen vastas 
reservas de gas (Augé, 2015). Esto presenta 
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una oportunidad para que la región prepare 
el terreno estableciendo el marco legislativo 
adecuado para beneficiarse plenamente de 
las actividades extractivas. El documento 
examina la política y los desafíos prácticos 
del régimen fiscal del petróleo y el gas des-
de una perspectiva fiscal internacional. El 
documento analiza los incentivos fiscales 
disponibles en el sector de petróleo y gas y si 
son dañinos o no dentro del ámbito de acción 
de la ocde beps 5, las áreas de riesgo fiscal 
internacional, las intervenciones disponibles 
en la ley actual y hace recomendaciones de 
políticas.
El régimen fiscal ha abordado la mayoría 
de las áreas de riesgo fiscal internacional. 
El ita requiere la determinación de precios 
de las transacciones. Los incentivos fiscales 
deben dirigirse a industrias específicas, so-
licitar un período de tiempo limitado, dejar 
poco espacio a la discreción personal y ser 
revisados  para garantizar su eficiencia y 
eficacia. El ita tiene reglas de precios de 
transferencia, reglas de cercado, reglas de 
capitalización delgada y prevé la tributación 
de la ganancia neta en las transferencias indi-
rectas. Sin embargo, existen desafíos como 
la capacidad inadecuada para auditar los cos-
tos, la falta de datos comparables de calidad, 
la explotación de la deuda en capital, ratio de 
restricción de intereses mediante el aumen-
to de capital, y la resolución de conflictos. 
El documento recomienda desarrollar más 
capacidad, mejorar la legislación y la coo-
peración entre las agencias gubernamentales 
para mantenerse al día con las crecientes 
necesidades de la industria.
Palabras clave: Incentivos Fiscales, In-
dustria Extractiva, Petróleo y gas.
I. Introduction
Many countries around the world have 
tax incentives to encourage investment in 
their economies or in some specific sector 
of the economy. Investors are looking for 
opportunities for capital investment to get 
the highest return and will pick the venture 
that gives the highest return among compet-
ing alternatives. 
Tax incentives are offered, mostly by de-
veloping countries, to attract foreign invest-
ment for economic growth and development. 
Different countries will try to increase their 
competitive edge by trying to outdo other 
countries in offering better or more incen-
tives. Ultimately, all the countries end up as 
losers. This has sometimes been described as 
a ‘race to the bottom’ (tjrn and ActionAid, 
2012, Razin and Sadka, 2011). 
Tax incentives are given at the expense of 
foregoing potential tax revenue. Incentives 
rank low among factors attracting invest-
ment2. Other factors, such as political and 
economic stability, rank high on the list. 
Tax incentives do not compensate for weak 
investment climate (James, 2013). 
Common tax incentives offered include 
tax reliefs for export processing zones, re-
liefs for special economic zones, incentives 
in the extractive industries and capital allow-
ances among others. 
2 unido, 2011, Africa Investor Report: Towards evidence-based investment promotion strategies.
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The extractive industry is highly special-
ized and thus requires a huge investment in 
capital and technology. Therefore, most de-
veloping countries offer incentives specific 
to the industry to attract foreign investment, 
at the expense of foregoing the much-need-
ed revenue for development. Multinational 
oil companies have the capital, technology, 
and enjoy economies of scale, to engage 
in oil exploration and production in these 
countries. Multinational enterprises (mnes) 
are also known for aggressive international 
tax planning3. Due to their international pres-
ence, mnes are able to reduce their tax liabil-
ity through base erosion and profit shifting 
(beps). They can achieve this through the 
use of debt instruments, financial arrange-
ments, financial hybrid instruments, transfer 
of mispriced assets, and management and 
procurement services from related entities.
Recent discoveries of oil in East Africa 
has increased the prospects of the region 
for investment by international oil compa-
nies. Discovery of commercially viable oil 
reserves in Uganda in 2006, led to further 
exploration in the neighboring countries, 
Kenya and Ethiopia (Augé, 2015). Kenya 
discovered oil in 2012. Tanzania and Mo-
zambique have huge gas deposits that both 
countries started to develop in 2004. None 
of the countries has started commercial pro-
duction except for Sudan which has been 
producing oil since 1999. The region has 
great potential that is underexplored; off-
shore exploration continues (Augé, 2015). 
Since the discovery of oil in 2012, Ken-
ya’s legislation on extractive industry has 
continued to evolve to incorporate the new 
developments. Recent changes include the 
introduction of a separate schedule to the 
Income Tax Act on taxation of the extrac-
tive industry in 2014, which separates the 
taxation treatment of mining and petroleum 
operations. Kenya’s tax regime offers incen-
tives to attract foreign investment, which 
include Special Economic Zones (sezs), 
Export Processing Zones (epzs), enhanced 
capital allowances, and exemption from 
import duty and value added tax (vat). All 
exports are zero rated for vat. 
Ideally, the revenue generated from the 
foreign investment should be retained in the 
country. However, the high level of illicit 
financial flow from Africa4 (Mbeki, 2015) 
threatens domestic revenue mobilization for 
development. Between 2002 and 2011, Ken-
ya lost revenue equivalent to 7.8 percent of 
its gdp from trade misinvoicing5 (gfi, 2014). 
Kenyan government has an obligation 
both to ensure that the tax incentives are eco-
nomical and at the same time, the granting of 
tax incentives falls within the international 
standards. oecd beps Action 5 focuses on 
countering harmful tax practices, to ensure 
a leveled playing field for countries. The 
oecd 1998 Report6 on harmful tax practices 
outlines the factors that determine whether 
a tax regime is harmful or not, in terms of 
3 oecd (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, oecd Publishing, Paris, https://doi.
org/10.1787/9789264192744-en.
4 Thabo Mbeki (2015) Illicit Financial Flow, Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows from Africa.
5 Global Financial Integrity, gfi (2014) Hiding in Plain Sight Trade Misinvoicing and the Impact 
of Revenue Loss in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda: 2002-2011.
6 oecd (1998). Harmful Tax Competition, An Emerging Global Issue; available at https://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/harmful-tax-competition_9789264162945-en
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creating fair competition among countries, 
and also provides the criteria for evaluating 
preferential regimes. A tax regime can be 
harmful if it has preferential features that 
allows some incomes to be subject to low or 
no taxation, or where the effective tax rate 
on some incomes is low compared to other 
countries, regime is ring fenced (restricted to 
non-residents or isolated from the domestic 
economy), lack of transparency or exchange 
of information. Most of the incentives inter-
national companies are likely to enjoy, that 
fall within the scope of Action 5, are under 
the special economic zones. 
As much as the extractive industry is likely 
to generate the much-needed resource reve-
nue for development, the domination of the 
industry by mnes, exposes the sector to chal-
lenges of international taxation. Simultane-
ously, tax incentives, which are common in 
the industry, erode the tax base, thus threat-
ening the sought-after tax revenue. This 
paper gives an analysis of the tax regime of 
the oil and gas sector from an international 
tax perspective. The writer discusses the tax 
incentives and international tax challenges 
facing the sector and investigates any legis-
lative interventions.
The objective of the study is to examine 
the policy and practical challenges of the oil 
and gas tax regime from an international tax 
perspective. The paper analyzes tax incen-
tives available in the oil and gas sector and 
whether they are harmful or not as per the 
international standards. The paper discusses 
the international tax risk areas for the oil and 
gas, available interventions in the current 
law, and makes policy recommendation.
The research covers the taxation of up-
stream oil and gas operations, specifical-
ly exploration and development activities, 
which have high future growth prospects. 
Kenya is yet to start production of oil and 
gas. Mining and quarrying are still in small 
scale hence it will be out of scope of this 
study. The findings can be expanded to oth-
er Eastern African countries facing simi-
lar conditions, in future. The objective was 
achieved through analysis of the relevant 
laws, government documents, and other rel-
evant literature, and best practice. 
The next section discusses the harmful 
tax practices as per the oecd Action 5 of the 
beps Project, section three the status of the 
extractive industry in Eastern Africa, prefer-
ential tax regime in Kenya and fiscal regime 
and tax incentives for oil and gas sector. Sec-
tion four discusses the policy and practical 
challenges in the oil and gas sector in Kenya, 
and section five concludes. 
II. Action 5 on Harmful tax practices
The oecd 15-point Action Plan of the 
beps project provides countries with a set 
of international tax rules to realign taxation 
with economic activities and value creation, 
and increase certainty and predictability to 
taxpayers. Action 57 builds on the oecd 1998 
Report6 on Harmful Tax Competition and 
expands the role of Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices (fhtp)8 that was formed as per the 
7 oecd (2015).
8 The role of fhtp under Action 5 is as follows: Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with 
a priority on improving transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings
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recommendations of the 1998 Report. fhtp 
has the mandate to review whether preferen-
tial regimes in participating countries around 
the world result in harmful tax competition.
The oecd 1998 Report, in chapter two, 
describes harmful tax practices in form of 
tax havens and harmful preferential tax re-
gimes applying to geographically mobile 
activities such as financial and other service 
activities, and provides criteria for identifi-
cation of harmful regimes. A tax regime can 
be harmful if it has preferential features that 
allows some types of income to be subject 
to no or low effective tax rate, if the regime 
is ring fenced (restricted to non-residents or 
isolated from the domestic economy), and 
there is lack of transparency or exchange of 
information with respect to the regime. The 
level of substantial activity also determines 
whether a preferential regime is potentially 
harmful. The fhtp defines the approaches 
to determine substantial activity level to 
assess preferential regimes, and focusses on 
improved transparency through exchange of 
rulings on preferential regimes (oecd, 2015).
Countries agreed on the nexus approach to 
determine substantial activity for preferen-
tial regimes (both intellectual property (ip) 
and non-ip regimes) (oecd, 2015). The nex-
us approach aligns expenditure to income. 
An entity benefits from an ip regime to the 
extent that it has incurred qualifying research 
and development expenditures that gave rise 
to the ip income. This takes into account the 
proportion of expenditure relating to devel-
oping the ip (the real value added) out of the 
overall expenditure by the taxpayer. 
Substantial activity with reference to non-
ip regimes refers to the core income generat-
ing activities required to produce a specific 
income covered by the preferential regime 
(oecd, 2015). An entity will benefit if it has 
undertaken core income generating activities 
in the jurisdiction providing the benefits. The 
core activities depend on the type of regime. 
Types of non-ip preferential regimes include 
holding company, headquarter, distribution 
centre, service centre, financing and leasing, 
fund management, banking, insurance, and 
shipping company regimes. The application 
of a regime will also vary from one country 
to another.
Improved transparency requires mandato-
ry spontaneous exchange on six categories of 
taxpayer-specific rulings: rulings relating to 
preferential regimes; unilateral advance pric-
ing agreements (apas) or other cross-bor-
der unilateral rulings in respect of transfer 
pricing; cross-border rulings providing for 
a downward adjustment of taxable profits; 
permanent establishment (pe) rulings; relat-
ed party conduit rulings; and any other type 
of ruling agreed by the fhtp (oecd, 2015).
III. Status of the Extractive industry in 
Eastern Africa
Eastern Africa has become an area of inter-
est for many international oil and gas com-
panies (Thuo, 2015). Countries in the region 
are struggling with high poverty levels and 
the prospects of oil and gas sector is likely 
to generate the much needed revenue to deal 
with poverty challenges. Oil was discovered 
in Uganda in 2006, which has led to more 
related to preferential regimes, and on requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime. It 
will take a holistic approach to evaluate preferential tax regimes in the beps context (oecd, 2013).
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discoveries in Kenya in 2012 (Augé, 2015). 
Tanzania and Mozambique have vast gas 
reserves (Augé, 2015). Further exploration is 
still ongoing in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia 
(Augé, 2015). 
None of the countries in Eastern Africa 
mentioned has started commercial produc-
tion, except for South Sudan and Sudan, 
which started production in 1999 (Augé, 
2015). Most of the oil discoveries were made 
in remote areas and thus a need for the ex-
tensive development of infrastructure before 
extraction can commence9. This presents 
an opportunity for the region to prepare the 
ground by putting in place the right legis-
lative framework to ensure the countries 
benefit fully from the extractive activities. 
The activities of oil and gas production are 
relatively new in the region and thus have at-
tracted many international players. This calls 
for proper policy to address emerging issues 
in the industry. Tax policy is central to this, 
to enhance future production sharing agree-
ments - the current agreements might not be 
affected by such changes since most of them 
have stabilization clauses which prevent the 
host country from altering the terms of the 
agreement in a way that adversely affects 
the Contractor10. 
Many developing countries face similar 
challenges in the taxation of cross-border 
taxation in the extractive industry, which in-
clude inadequate transfer pricing rules, inad-
equate capacity, political interference, lack 
of proper coordination between intergov-
ernmental agencies, and difficulty in getting 
taxpayer’s information (Readhead, 2016; 
Sunley, et al., 2003). Some resource-rich 
countries in Africa, such as South Africa, 
Tanzania and Zambia11, have enacted poli-
cies counter tax evasion by mnes. In 2015, 
South Africa introduced restriction of inter-
est deduction of amounts above 40 percent 
of taxable earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (ebitda), 
adjusted according to changes in South Af-
rican Reserve Bank interest rate (Readhead, 
2017). Tanzania has set up a special agency 
to audit mining companies11. Zambia legis-
lation on mining has undergone numerous 
changes recent one being the introduction 
of price based royalty on Copper, replacing 
royalty based on profits, and further, require 
mining companies to use publicly quoted 
benchmark prices11. 
A. Extractive industry in Kenya
Kenya belongs to the lower middle-in-
come group, according to the World Bank, 
with a real gdp per capita of usd 1,169.3 in 
201712 (wdi, 2018) and an average economic 
growth rate of 5 percent13 (knbs, 2017). Its 
major source of revenue is taxes: taxes fi-
9 The State of Oil and Gas in East Africa; available at https://www.mmaks.co.ug/sites/mmaks.
co.ug/files/article-attachments/2017/07/state-oil-and-gas-east-africa.pdf
10 Clause 40 of Production Sharing Contract between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and 
Camac Energy Kenya Limited; available at http://downloads.openoil.net/contracts/ke/ke_Block-
L-16_dd20120510_psc_Camac.pdf
11 Lassourd and Readhead (2017). Securing Mining Revenues: Good Practice from Zambia, 
Tanzania, South Africa; available at https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/securing-mining-reve-
nues-good-practice-zambia-tanzania-south-africa
12 World Development Indicators (wdi); available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
13 Economic Survey (2018); available at https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/economic-survey-2018/
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nanced 60.7 per cent of the budget during the 
financial year 2016/201713 (knbs, 2017). 
Mining industry in Kenya is relatively 
small, only accounting for 0.8 per cent of the 
gdp in 201613 (knbs, 2017). Some of the 
minerals include soda ash, fluorspar, base ti-
tanium, coal, magnesite and gypsum. British 
company Tullow Oil discovered oil reserves 
in 2012 - the oil reserves are estimated to be 
600 million barrels (Augé, 2015). On June 
3, 2018, the president flagged off the first 
consignment of Kenya’s crude oil under the 
Early Oil Pilot Scheme (eops)14. Commer-
cial production is expected to start in 2021. 
Hence the focus of the paper is on upstream 
operations which involve the exploration 
and development activities.
Key institutions15 in the extractive industry 
are the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, the Na-
tional Oil Corporation of Kenya Limited 
(nock), National Land Commission, County 
Governments and Kenya Revenue Authority. 
B. Preferential Tax Regimes in Kenya
Tax incentives in the Kenyan tax regime 
under the current law16 include Special 
Economic Zones (sezs), Export Processing 
Zones (epzs), capital allowances, exemption 
from import duty and vat. epz was reviewed 
by fhtp and its status is out of the scope of 
work of fhtp17. fhtp reviews regimes which 
applying to geographically mobile activities 
such as financial and other service activities 
- regimes meant to attract plant, building and 
equipment are outside the scope of fhtp8. 
sez is currently under review. Kenya does 
not have ip preferential regime.
epz is meant to promote the country’s ex-
ports. It is outside the customs territory and 
hence exempt from paying import duty and 
vat on its imports under the Value Added 
Tax Act and Customs and Excise Act. Enter-
prises in epz produce for export. All exports 
are zero rated for vat. An export processing 
zone enterprise is licensed by Export Pro-
cessing Zone Authority (Export Processing 
Zones Act, 1990). epz enterprises are ex-
empted from paying any corporation tax for 
the first 10 years of operation, but the cor-
poration rate of tax will be 25 percent for the 
next 10 years and the normal corporate tax 
rate of 30 percent thereafter (Third Sched-
ule to the Income Tax Act, ita). Dividends 
paid to non-resident shareholders from the 
tax exempt profits are exempt from the 10 
percent withholding tax (ita).
sezs are new in Kenya introduced by the 
Special Economic Zones Act, 2015, to attract 
14 Kiplang’at Jeremiah (2018, June 3) Kenya beats odds to become first ea nation to export oil. 
Daily Nation; available at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-s-journey-as-an-oil-exporter-
starts/1056-4593378-j9fim8z/index.html
15 Conducting Oil and Gas Activities in Kenya; available at https://www.africalegalnetwork.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2017/05/Conducting-Oil-Gas-Activities-Kenya-1.pdf
16 Income Tax Act, 1973, Chapter 470 of the Laws of Kenya, Value Added Tax Act, Excise Duty 
Act, East Africa Management Act, Customs and Excise Act, and bilateral agreements granting 
special tax treatment to the parties).
17 Harmful Tax Practices –2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes Inclusive Framework 
on beps: Action 5 (Update as of 9 May 2018); available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/update-
harmful-tax-practices-2017-progress-report-on-preferential-regimes.pdf
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foreign investment. Just like epzs, sezs are 
outside the customs territory and hence ex-
empt from paying import duty and vat on 
its imports under the Value Added Tax Act 
and Customs and Excise Act. sez do not 
exclusively produce for export, hence any 
local sales are subject to vat at the standard 
rate. sezs could comprise of agricultural 
zone and business service park including 
business process outsourcing (bpos) and in-
dustrial park. Special economic zone enter-
prise, developer or operator, licensed under 
the Special Economic Zones Act, enjoy a 
reduced corporate tax rate of 10 percent for 
the first 10 years of operation and thereafter 
15 percent for another ten years. The corpo-
rate tax rate for other local companies is 30 
percent. Dividends received by a registered 
venture capital company special economic 
zone enterprises, developers and operators 
licensed under the Special Economic Zones 
Act are tax exempt. Payments other than 
dividends made to non-residents by sezs 
are subject to withholding tax the rate of 10 
percent. This can be compared with a rate of 
20 percent withholding tax rate applicable 
on management or professional fee paid to 
a non-resident (Third Schedule to the ita)
The Second Schedule to the ita grants 
investment allowance on specific capital 
expenditure incurred by entities in the fur-
therance of business, such as capital expend-
iture incurred in acquisition of machinery by 
a manufacturing firm. The government also 
exempts from duties and vat some items 
procured by some specific industries or pro-
jects that are a priority in the development 
agenda. Nonetheless, these incentives might 
not fall within the scope of focus of Action 
5 which is geographically mobile activities 
such as financial and other services activi-
ties.
C. Fiscal Regime for Oil  
and Gas in Kenya
Kenya has been continuously improving 
its legislation to keep up with the recent 
developments in oil and gas sector in the 
country. Currently, the major laws guid-
ing the operations of oil and gas are; The 
Constitution; Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act18(pepa), Chapter 308 of the 
Laws of Kenya; Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Regulations, 1984; and Income 
Tax Act19 (ita), Chapter 470, Laws of Kenya 
(the Ninth Schedule).
The Minister of Energy and Petroleum, 
on behalf of the government, licenses com-
panies that want to engage in petroleum 
operations in the country (pepa). The Min-
ister negotiates petroleum agreements with 
contractors and issues exploration permits. 
The pepa Regulations contain the model 
Production Sharing Contract20 (psc) which 
forms the basis of negotiations between the 
contractors and the Government. The psc 
contains the terms, rights and obligations 
of parties, the fees payable and sharing of 
revenue under the contract. The profit share 
18 Government of Kenya (GoK). The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act; available at 
https://www.nationaloil.co.ke/pdf/petroleum_act_kenya.pdf
19 The Income Tax Act, Chapter 470, Laws of Kenya; available at https://www.kra.go.ke/notices/
pdf2015/Income-Tax-Act-2014.pdf
20 Government of Kenya (GoK). The Model Production Sharing Agreement; available at https://
nationaloil.co.ke/pdf/Model_psc_2015_-_210115.pdf
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of the government is based on the profit 
oil and the share increases as production 
increases. Only companies incorporated or 
registered in Kenya can enter into petroleum 
agreements with the Government. Petroleum 
agreement is signed for a specified contract 
area (specified geographical area that the 
Government may authorize a contractor to 
engage in petroleum operations under a pe-
troleum agreement). The government share 
of revenue from oil is based on profits as 
provided for in the psc. The government 
share in the model psc increases as produc-
tion increases, from 50 percent to 78 percent 
of profit oil (Annex 1). The subnational 
government is to receive 20 percent and the 
local community 5 percent of the govern-
ment share of the oil revenue21; the rest (75 
percent) remains in the national kitty.
The Income Tax Act (ita) provides the 
general tax regime, while the Ninth Schedule 
to the Income Tax Act contains the specific 
tax regime for the extractive industry. The 
overhaul of the Ninth Schedule through the 
Finance Act 201422, ushered in a new, more 
comprehensive, regime for the taxation of 
the extractive industry that distinguished 
taxation of mining operations from petro-
leum operations, which was not the case 
before. Gains and profits of the contractors 
in the extractive industry are taxed at the 
corporation tax rate of 30 percent for resi-
dents and 37.5 percent for non-residents. The 
income tax from the petroleum operations 
by the contractors is carved out of the Gov-
ernment’s share of production. Expenditure 
or losses incurred in a contract area under 
a petroleum agreement is only deductible 
against income of that contract area. In case 
of a loss, the loss can be carried forward 
until it is exhausted or the operations of the 
contract area have ceased. Losses can be 
carried back for up to a period three years 
from the year in which the loss arose. The 
ita does not allow loss carry back under the 
general tax rules.
Net gain from disposal of interest under 
a Production Sharing Contract (psc is also 
taxed at the corporate tax rate of 30 percent 
for residents and 37.5 percent or non-res-
idents. Natural Resource Income (nri) or 
royalties are subject to withholding tax of 
5 percent for residents and 20 percent for 
non-residents. The withholding tax rate may 
be lower that this if the recipient of the in-
come is resident in a country that has a tax 
treaty with Kenya. The ita defines nri as an 
amount paid as consideration for the right 
to take minerals or a living or non-living 
resource from land or sea, or an amount cal-
culated in whole or in part by reference to 
the quantity or value of minerals or a living 
or non-living resource taken from land or 
sea. Direct or indirect transfers of interest in 
Kenya are subject to capital gains tax (ita). 
Thin capitalization rules apply whereby 
interest expense is deductible to the extent 
that the debt to capital ratio does not exceed 
two to one (2:1). The rate of withholding 
21 Business Daily (2018, May 18). Uhuru: All clear for oil production after govt-county deal; 
available at https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Governments-strike-agreement-on-oil-
production/539546-4570134-dh71ij/index.html
22 The Finance Act 2014; available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Fi-
nance_Act_16of2014Final.pdf
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tax on dividends is 10 percent on the gross 
amount; the rate is 15 percent on interest for 
non-residents (Ninth Schedule to the ita). 
1. Tax incentives in oil and gas sector
Oil and gas sector enjoy other special tax 
treatment due to the nature of their opera-
tions. Oil exploration is a high-risk venture 
which involves high sunk costs years before 
any production can begin. The government, 
therefore, needs to provide a conducive en-
vironment that will attract investors into 
the sector, which may entail, among other 
things, a favourable tax treatment. 
Capital expenditure incurred during ex-
ploration and development is deductible 
expense against taxable income. Machinery 
first used to undertake exploration opera-
tions enjoy an accelerated depreciation at 
the rate of a 100 percent (Ninth Schedule to 
the ita). The imports of equipment by con-
tractors and subcontractors for exploration 
and development activities are exempt from 
vat and customs duty under the model psc23.
The contractors are allowed to carry for-
ward losses indefinitely, and if operations 
cease, they are allowed to carry back losses 
up to a period of three years (Ninth Sched-
ule to the ita). The general tax regime only 
allows loss to be carried forward up to a pe-
riod of ten years and does not allow carrying 
back of losses.
Service fee paid to a non-resident subcon-
tractor in respect of petroleum operations 
is subject to a withholding tax at the rate of 
5.625 percent on the gross amount. Manage-
ment, training and professional fee paid by a 
contractor to any other non-resident person 
is subject to withholding tax of 12.5 percent 
on the gross amount. Both rates are lower 
compared to the general withholding tax rate 
of 20 percent charged on management and 
professional fee including contractual fee, 
payable to non-residents (Ninth Schedule 
to the ita).
2. Adherence to international Standards
The special tax regime discussed above 
would not be considered to be potentially 
harmful, as per oecd beps Action 5, be-
cause, first, the tax rate applicable on gains 
from petroleum is not low, it is the corporate 
tax rate of 30 percent for residents and 37.5 
percent for non-residents. Secondly, the re-
gime is open to both residents and non-resi-
dents; it is not ring-fenced from the domestic 
economy. Thirdly, there is substantial activ-
ity on the various sites of oil exploration. 
And lastly, the incentive regimes are open 
to the public, such as the model psc and the 
provisions of the ita.
Where a preferential regime is potentially 
harmful, the fhtp recommends for either 
abolish of the regime; or the remove the fea-
tures that create the harmful effect. 
That said, it is important to ensure tax 
incentives conform to best practice to in-
crease their efficiency and effectiveness for 
the benefit of the country. Some incentives 
23 : Clause 32(3) of the Model Production Sharing Agreement. Government of Kenya (GoK); 
available at https://nationaloil.co.ke/pdf/Model_psc_2015_-_210115.pdf
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may have adverse effects to the economy. A 
working group by World Bank (2015) pro-
vides a report on some guiding principles 
for low-income countries’ effective and ef-
ficient use of tax incentives. Tax incentives 
targeting the export-oriented sector are seen 
to be more effective than those for domestic 
sectors. Cost based tax incentives such as 
capital allowance are seen to be more effec-
tive than profit based incentives such as tax 
holidays. Incentives should target specific 
industries; apply for a limited time period; 
leave little room for personal discretion; and 
be reviewed regularly to check their efficien-
cy and effectiveness (James, 2013; World 
Bank, 2015). James (2013) also advocates 
for regional cooperation to avoid the race 
to the bottom.
Further taxation issues are laid out in the 
next section.
IV. Policy and Practical Challenges in 
the oil and gas sector in Kenya
The taxation regime for the oil and gas 
sector in Kenya is relatively new and is still 
evolving. As observed, this is a specialized 
sector and thus has a distinct tax regime. 
The policymakers have to balance between 
attracting investment and optimizing tax 
revenue for development. At the same time, 
the law should address the challenges in 
the taxation of mnes, which dominate the 
sector. The law should be adequate and tax 
administrators need to be well equipped to 
administer it.
Some of the challenges in the taxation 
of the sector include; overstatement of ex-
ploration and development costs, transfer 
pricing issues, thin capitalization, ring-fenc-
ing, indirect transfers, and valuation of the 
product. The first four issues are discussed 
further in paragraphs that follow. Kenya is 
yet to start oil production, and currently, 
the Ninth schedule only covers the scope 
of exploration and development activities, 
hence product valuation is not covered in 
the current tax legislation.
A. Overstatement of exploration and 
development costs 
The operations of the petroleum industry 
involve huge exploration and development 
before the production can begin. Exploration 
expenditure is incurred in finding or discov-
ery of the resource. It is defined in the Ninth 
Schedule to the ita, to include exploration 
costs authorized under the petroleum agree-
ment before the development phase begins. 
These are costs of; acquisition of an interest 
in the petroleum agreement or petroleum 
information; geological, geophysical, and 
geochemical surveys; aerial mapping; strati-
graphic tests; drilling of test wells; or any 
other work that is necessarily connected with 
exploration activities (ita). 
Exploration expenditure is allowable 
against income of a contract area during the 
year in which the expenditure was incurred 
(Paragraph 9(3) of Ninth Schedule to the 
ita). The machinery first used to undertake 
exploration operations enjoy an accelerated 
depreciation at the rate 100 percent; hence 
cost of such equipment should be correctly 
valued. 
Development expenditure is incurred to 
get access to the discovered resource and 
facilitate commercial production. It is de-
fined in paragraph one of the Ninth Schedule 
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to the ita, as including capital expenditure 
incurred by a contractor when carrying out 
operations authorized under a development 
plan in a petroleum agreement. Development 
expenditure is an allowable deduction at the 
rate of 20 percent per annum until it is ex-
hausted (Paragraph 10(1) of Ninth Schedule 
to the ita). 
Costs of borrowing capital equipment used 
in the exploration and development phase 
are capitalized (Ninth Schedule to the ita) 
and may form part of the exploration or de-
velopment expenditure.
A company can hire a related party to con-
duct some of these exploration and devel-
opment activities, which poses a risk for tax 
revenue. The key institutions lack adequate 
capacity to audit the cost at the exploration 
and development stage to ensure costs are 
not overstated, and are accorded appropriate 
treatment. This poses another risk since the 
contractors can claim substantial artificial 
costs.
The regulators, tax administrators, and the 
relevant government ministries or depart-
ments should monitor these costs closely 
during the exploration and development 
phase to ensure that the costs are at arm’s 
length and are correctly valued.
B. Transfer pricing issues
Expenses wholly and exclusively incurred 
in furtherance of the business are allowable 
deductions (ita). Management and profes-
sional fees, and service fees to subcontrac-
tors allowed for tax purposes. The service 
fees are also subject to withholding tax at a 
lower rate (Ninth Schedule to the ita). The 
fees are also subject to manipulation, es-
pecially where a related party provides the 
services. Kenya has Transfer Pricing Rules, 
2006, which provides for various methods of 
determining an arm’s length price. Related 
party transactions should be stated at arm’s 
length prices, as per the Transfer Pricing 
Rules, 2006 (ita).
Nonetheless, just like other developing 
countries with a large number of mnes, Ken-
ya faces the risk of tax base erosion through 
mispricing of cross-border transactions. De-
spite having transfer pricing rules in place, 
they are not sufficiently detailed hence the 
taxpayer has to refer to international guides 
such as the oecd and un Model Convention. 
Other challenges that tax administrators face 
in implementation of transfer pricing rules 
in the mining sectors are difficulty in getting 
access to the taxpayer’s documentation, lack 
of comparables data to compute arm’s length 
prices, political interests and resolution of 
transfer pricing disputes (Readhead, 2016; 
Sunley, et al., 2003).
C. Thin capitalization
A company is thinly capitalized if it fi-
nances its operations mainly through debt as 
opposed to equity. Thinly capitalized com-
panies are likely to have huge interest ex-
penses. Interest expense is deductible against 
income, thus debt financing can be used by 
companies for tax planning. As a result, 
various countries have established thin cap-
italization rules to limit the interest expense 
deductible. In Kenya, interest expense de-
duction for oil and gas companies is limited 
to the extent that the debt to equity ratio does 
not exceed 2:1 (Ninth Schedule to the ita). 
Equity is defined as the sum of the revenue 
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reserves and the issued and paid-up capital 
of all classes of shares of the company, and 
debt means loans, overdrafts, ordinary trade 
debts, overdrawn current accounts or any 
other form of indebtedness for which the 
company is paying a financial charge, in-
terest, discount or premium (Section 16(2)
(j) of ita).
However, interest restriction based on the 
debt to equity ratio can still be exploited 
by some companies, which use the debt 
to acquire more capital. That’s why South 
Africa made a shift from the debt to equity 
ratio to interest restriction based on ebitda 
(Readhead, 2017). This is in line with the 
recommendations of oec beps Action 424.
D. Ring-fencing rules
Ring-fencing in the extractive industry 
prevents the consolidation of income and ex-
penditure from different activities carried out 
by the same taxpayer (Sunley, et. Al., 2003, 
par.2, pp.5). Consolidation may encourage 
further exploration since the company is able 
to recoup its costs in time, but it may also 
give room for tax avoidance whereby the 
company continues doing other exploration 
activities to increase their deductibles, so as 
to remain in a loss position. Governments 
introduce ring-fencing rules to protect their 
tax base (Sunley, et. Al., 2003). 
The Ninth schedule to the ita has 
ring-fencing rules per contract area, that is, 
per petroleum agreement. The expenditure 
incurred on one contract is only deductible 
against income derived by the contractor 
from the same contract area. A loss incurred 
in a contract area can only be carried forward 
and deducted against income of that contract 
area. Thus the calculation of taxable liabili-
ty is done separately for each contract area. 
This protects government revenue.
E. Indirect transfers
Indirect transfers in the extractive industry 
has been an issue of concern for many devel-
oping countries, and is now one of the areas 
addressed in the toolkit for “The Taxation 
of Offshore Indirect Transfers”, developed 
by The Platform for Collaboration on Tax25. 
The Platform was formed in 2016 to develop 
capacity for developing countries on inter-
national tax matters. The toolkit22 defines 
an indirect transfer as the disposition of an 
indirect ownership interest in an asset, in 
whole or in part. The authorities of the ju-
risdiction in which the asset is located run 
the risk of missing out on taxing the net gain 
on an indirect transfer of such an asset if the 
transfer happens overseas. This is likely to 
happen if the local law is inadequate or due 
to lack knowledge about the transfer.
Capital gain that accrues on transfer of 
property situated in Kenya is taxable in Ken-
ya (ita, the date of acquisition of property is 
irrelevant). Under the Ninth Schedule to the 
ita, a contractor is required to notify the tax 
24 oecd (2016), Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Pay-
ments, Action 4 - 2016 Update: Inclusive Framework on beps, oecd/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, oecd Publishing, Paris; available at https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264268333-en.
25 The Platform for Collaboration on Tax. The Taxation of Offshore Indirect Transfers— A Toolkit; 
available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/322921531421551268/a-toolkit-draft-
version-2
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administrator in case of a change in the un-
derlying ownership (change of 10 percent or 
more). The net gain from disposal of interest, 
if the interest derives its value directly or in-
directly from immovable property in Kenya, 
is subject to capital gains tax under the ita; 
as from January 2015. Immovable property 
means a mining right, an interest in a pe-
troleum agreement, mining information or 
petroleum information (ita). This includes a 
sale of petroleum exploration licences. This 
is the source of an ongoing dispute between 
Africa Oil and Kenya Revenue Authority26. 
The details of the case are not open to the 
public access yet, since it is still ongoing 
Court matter.
Another dispute of a similar nature was 
Heritage Oil and Gas Vs Uganda Revenue 
Authority (ura)27, 2011. Heritage Oil sold 
its exploration licences in Uganda to Tullow 
Oil Uganda Limited for us$ 1.45 billion, 
after which Heritage Oil ceased operations 
in Uganda. ura demanded 30 percent of the 
sales proceeds as capital gains tax. Heritage 
Oil objected to the tax assessment, arguing 
that the sale did not take place in Uganda, 
and Heritage Oil was not incorporated in 
Uganda but in Mauritius. They further ar-
gued that the Product Sharing Agreement 
did not provide for capital gains tax, and the 
Tax Appeals Tribunal in Uganda did not have 
the jurisdiction to determine the matter. ura 
on the other hand, argued that the assets sold 
were located in Uganda, and the sale was 
made with the consent of the Uganda gov-
ernment, hence subject to the Uganda Law. 
The Tribunal ruled in favour of ura28, up-
holding the tax assessment on Heritage Oil.
The contractor has an obligation to notify 
the Commissioner of Taxes if there is any 
change in ownership of at least 10 percent 
(Ninth Schedule to the ita). Where the con-
tractor fails to notify the Commissioner of 
Taxes about a transfer oversees of a local 
asset, the Commissioner may not know the 
details of such a transaction. The model psc 
provides for arbitration in accordance with 
the arbitration rules adopted by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade 
Laws. This might undermine the local Courts 
jurisdiction, in determining any disputes 
arising.
V. Conclusion
Kenyan legislation has kept pace with the 
developments in the oil and gas sector in the 
country. The overhaul of the Ninth Schedule 
to the Income Tax Act, in 2014, brought in a 
new taxation regime for extractive industry. 
The tax incentives enjoyed by the industry, 
under the current tax regime, may not be 
considered to be potentially harmful under 
the oecd beps Action 5 on Harmful Tax 
Practices; the tax rate applicable to gains 
from petroleum is not low, the regime is not 
ring-fenced from the domestic economy and 
there is substantial activity taking place on 
the various sites of oil exploration. 
26 Irungu, G. (2018. August 20). kra in Sh5.2bn tax row with Turkana oil firm; available at https://
www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/kra-in-Sh5-2bn-tax-row-with-Turkana-oil-firm/539546-
4720406-14eomxiz/index.html
27 Understanding the Tax Dispute: Heritage, Tullow, and The Government of Uganda; available 
at http://www.acode-u.org/Files/Publications/infosheet_16.pdf
28 Ruling of the Heritage v ura; available at https://www.scribd.com/document/148699647/
Ruling-of-the-Heritage-v-ura-Income-Tax-Dispute
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The tax regime has addressed most of the 
international tax risk areas. The ita requires 
arm’s length pricing of transactions, and the 
Transfer Pricing Rules, provide methods of 
determining an arm’s length price. Interest 
deduction is restricted for thinly capitalized 
companies, where the debt to equity ratio 
exceeds two to one. Ring-fencing rules apply 
to a contract area, and net gain on indirect 
transfers of interest derived from petrole-
um agreement or petroleum information is 
taxable in Kenya. However there are still 
challenges in the following areas: inadequate 
capacity of the regulators to audit explora-
tion and development cost; challenges with 
application of transfer pricing rules such as 
lack of quality comparables data; exploita-
tion of the debt to equity ratio interest re-
striction through increasing capital; lack of 
information on indirect transfer happening 
overseas; and dispute resolution.
Tax incentives should also be efficient 
and effective to attract investment for de-
velopment. Best practice advocates for in-
centives that are cost-based as opposed to 
profit based, targeting specific industries; 
apply for a limited time period, leave little 
room for personal discretion, and reviewed 
regularly (James, 2013; World Bank, 2015).
It is important for the regulators, tax ad-
ministrators, and the relevant government 
ministries or departments, to monitor costs 
closely, especially during the exploration 
and development phase, to ensure they cor-
rectly accounted for and are at arm’s length, 
to counter tax avoidance. The regulator 
should ensure withholding taxes applicable 
are duly paid. Monitoring and enforcement 
are key to ensure compliance with the law 
and will protect government revenue. 
Further improvements need to be made, 
such as building more capacity, enhance-
ment of legislation and cooperation between 
government agencies, to keep up with the 
growing needs of the industry. Currently 
government share of revenue is based on 
the profit oil which may not be ideal, due 
to huge tax deduction; the share could be 
based on oil revenues. With production ex-
pected to start in about three years, that is 
the year 2021, legislation on taxation at the 
production phase should be put in place tax 
legislation on product valuation, which is 
not yet in place. 
References
Augé, B. (2015). Oil and Gas in Eastern Africa: Current 
Developments and Future Perspectives. Retrieved 
from http://www.ocppc.ma/sites/default/files/ocppc-
Ifri-pn1502.pdf
James, S. 2013. Tax and non-tax incentives and inves-
tments: Evidence and Policy Implications, Investment 
Climate Advisory Services. World Bank Group. Re-
trieved from https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401905
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (knbs). (1960-
2016). Economic Survey. Nairobi: Government 
Printers.
oecd (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, oecd Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264162945-en
oecd (2015), Countering Harmful Tax Practices 
More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency 
and Substance, Action 5 - 2015 Final Report, oecd/
G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, oecd 
Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264241190-en
Razin, A., & Sadka, E. (2011). Tax competition and 
migration: the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis revisi-
ted. cesifo Econ6omic Studies, 58(1), 164-180.
Readhead, A. (2016) Preventing Tax Base Erosion 
in Africa: a Regional Study of Transfer Pricing 
Challenges in the Mining Sector. National Resource 
Governance Institute (nrgi). Retrieved from https://
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/
nrgi_transfer-pricing-study.pdf
219
Revista de Derecho Fiscal n.º 14 • enero-junio de 2019 • pp. 203-219
The Kenyan tax regime for the Oil and Gas Sector: An International Tax Perspective to Policy…
Readhead, A. (2017). Preventing Base Erosion: South 
Africa’s Interest Limitation Rules. National Resource 
Governance Institute (nrgi). Retrieved from https://
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/
preventing-base-erosion-south-africa-limitation-rule.
pdf
Sunley, E. M., Baunsgaard, T., & Simard, D. (2003). 
Revenue from the oil and gas sector: Issues and 
country experience. Fiscal policy formulation and 
implementation in oil-producing countries, 153-183. 
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
inttpa/Resources/SunleyPaper.pdf
Tax Justice Research-Africa (tjrn-A) & ActionAid, 
(2012). Tax competition in East Africa: A race to the 
bottom?
Thuo, D. N. (2015). Petroleum Contracts and Taxation: 
is East Africa Prepared? In K. Olsen (Ed.), Special 
issue on International Taxation in the Energy Sector, 
13(4). Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (ogel). 
Retrieved from 
https://karuspace.karu.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/20. 
500.12092/1668/Petroleum%20Contracts%20and%20
Taxation.pdf?sequence=1
World Bank. (2015). Options for low income coun-
tries’ effective and efficient use of tax incentives for 
investment: a report to the G-20 development working 
group by the imf, oecd, un and World Bank (English). 
Platform for Collaboration on Tax. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Group. Retrieved from https://www.imf.
org/external/np/g20/pdf/101515.pdf
World Bank (wb). (2018). World Development Indica-
tors (wdi). Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.
org/data/
VI. Appendix
Annex 1: Government share of profit 
from oil
The profit oil share of the government and 
contractor depends on the daily production. 
The percentages provided in the model pro-
duction sharing agreement (2015) are as 
follows:
Incremental  
Production Tranches
Govern-
ment  
Share
Contractor 
Share
0 - 30,000 barrels per day 50% 50%
Next 25,000 barrels per 
day 60% 40%
Next 25,000 barrels per 
day 65% 35%
Next 20,000 barrels per 
day 70% 30%
Above 100,000 barrels 
per day 78% 22%
Source: Clause 27(3) of the Model Production Sharing 
Agreement. Government of Kenya (GoK). https://natio-
naloil.co.ke/pdf/Model_psc_2015_-_210115.pdf
Annex 2: Kenyan oil and gas blocks
Figure 1.
Oil and Gas Blocks
http://extractives-baraza.com/resources/overview-of-ken-
yas-extractive-industry/oil-and-gas
